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“The day it became clear that disclosure was a powerful regulatory tool was June 30, 
1988, when Richard J. Mahoney, then head of Monsanto (one of the biggest chemical 
manufacturers in the U.S.), made a dramatic claim. Mahoney said bluntly that he had 
been astounded by the magnitude of Monsanto’s annual release of 374 million pounds of 
toxins. He vowed to cut the release of air emissions 90% worldwide by the end of 1992.”
2 
 
Atlantic Monthly, April 2000 
 
Abstract 
 
The  Toxic  Release  Inventory  (TRI),  which  the  United  States  Congress  enacted  in  1986,  is  the  largest 
“Right  to  Know”  program  in  the  world.  Each  year  over  20,000  facilities  are  required  to  report  their 
emissions of hundreds of toxic chemicals to the government for dissemination to the public. Facilities that 
comprise the “Top 10” worst polluters within states not only emit a hugely disproportionate share of total  
U.S. environmental releases, but receive significant negative attention from the media, citizen’s groups, and 
non-governmental organizations. This paper uses exogenous changes to pollution rankings within states 
(due to the expansion of the industries covered by the TRI in 1998) as a way to test whether being labeled a 
“Top 10” worst polluter affected a facility’s total environmental releases. The results indicate that firms did 
respond to the “Top 10” worst polluter identification. Facilities that experienced an unexpected downward 
shift in their rankings, which led to their removal from the “Top 10” rankings within their states, reduced 
their emissions by hundreds of thousands of pounds less than they would have had they not experienced the 
drop in their rankings brought about by the introduction of the new highly polluting industries. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
  When a government mandates that private firms provide environmental data to 
the public this is known as a “Right to Know” program. These programs can decrease the 
asymmetric information between public and private entities, thereby “leveling the playing 
field” such that members of the public can more easily express their environmental 
preferences. For example, in the absence of such a government mandate, the public may 
be aware that certain firms in their state discharge toxic wastes (simply by observing 
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2 Between 1988 and 1992 TRI reported environmental releases from Monsanto facilities dropped almost 
94%.    2 
smokestacks or water discharge pipes), but not know how much or of what type. Once 
this information is known, however, the public can exert pressure on those firms that 
pollute the most or pose the greatest risk.  
  In 1986, on the heels of the 1984 Union Carbide chemical disaster in Bhopal, 
India, and the subsequent chemical plant accident in West Virginia, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), which 
required all manufacturing facilities employing more than 10 people and using more than 
10,000 pounds of any of 377 listed toxic chemicals to report their emissions and 
transfers
3 to the U.S. government annually for dissemination to the public. This 
information is organized under the heading of the “Toxic Release Inventory” (TRI) and it 
represented the first nationally mandated public “Right to Know” program in U.S. 
history.  
Since its first year in 1987, the TRI has been expanded to include almost 650 
chemicals as well as several additional industries that were initially exempt. These 
include all federal agencies as well as power and mining companies. From 1988 to 1997 
total environmental releases reported under the TRI fell nearly 63% and from 1998 to 
2001 they fell an additional 19% (it is not possible to compare aggregate emissions 
reductions across the entire time period due to the expansion of the program in 1998). 
The key question for both policy-makers and academics is whether the publication of the 
TRI is at least partially responsible for this dramatic decrease in emissions
4.  
Armed with the detailed data provided by the TRI, members of the public can 
exert pressure on firms to reduce their emissions through a number of channels
5, 
including: 
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1. Political Pressure
6: At the behest of environmental organizations or concerned 
citizens, politicians may try to enact legislation to curb firm emissions, and the threat 
alone may be sufficient to influence firm behavior.  
 
2. “Green consumerism”: Consumers, firms, and government and non-governmental 
agencies can exert pressure on companies by purchasing less products from highly 
polluting firms or by rewarding less polluting firms with increased business. 
 
3. Future liability: Once pollution data is part of the public domain this creates a record 
for any future liabilities firms may face regarding environmental or human health claims.  
 
4. Future Expansion: Firms that want to expand their business, especially in new 
locations, will find it more difficult to do so if their current operations are known to be 
highly polluting. 
 
  Since all of the environmental release data reported under the TRI fall within 
legally defined limits set by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), any 
changes in facility releases that can be traced to the dissemination of the TRI data suggest 
that the TRI has provided a public benefit
7.  
“Top 10” worst polluter lists
8 have become popular in the television, print, and 
internet media, as well as with environmental groups, since they focus attention on a 
small subset of the TRI facilities that emit the overwhelming share of toxic chemicals. 
                                                                                                                                                
create pressure from within the firm to improve environmental performance even in the absence of outside 
pressure (see Gunningham et at. 2003). 
6 Bui (2005) provides evidence that suggests that the use of the TRI information by local and state 
politicians, which used it to craft additional legislation and focus pressure on worst polluters, was most 
responsible for changes in firm behavior brought about by the TRI in the petroleum industry. 
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than the costs imposed on them if they maintain the status quo. This needn’t imply that the chemical 
reductions are necessarily optimum from a social benefits standpoint, but that the TRI is providing the 
public with information that it finds useful. For a more thorough discussion of the overall benefit of the TRI 
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The EPA’s TRI Explorer website allows users to rank facilities and provides “state 
reports” that highlight the “Top 10” greatest emitters each year
9. Also, the internet’s most 
popular environmental website, Scorecard
10, which receives over 100,000 visits per 
month, displays a rotating set of “Top 10” worst polluter lists on its homepage. Firms that 
find themselves in these dubious “spotlights” will most likely face significant public 
pressure to decrease their emissions. An added benefit of examining only those facilities 
with the highest environmental releases is that this largely avoids the problem presented 
by the reporting thresholds for individual chemicals. Almost all of the “Top 10” facilities 
within states report environmental releases for most chemicals that are much greater than 
the 10,000 pound limits. 
Although prior to the establishment of any environmental “Right-to-Know” 
program existing firms had the opportunity to highlight their positive environmental 
performance (as a means to attract business or promote a positive image), there is 
evidence that the costs to firms of poor environmental performance are much greater than 
the relative benefits of good performance (O’Rourke 2005). This may be explained by the 
theory of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1991), which states that people tend to 
value losses much more than commensurate gains. Behavioral economists have 
conducted numerous laboratory experiments in which they have uncovered evidence of 
loss aversion, and they point to many aspects of contemporary U.S. law that explicitly 
recognize it (Kahneman et al. 1991). For example, in court rulings losses are often treated 
much more seriously than foregone gains when assessing damages. This heightened 
sensitivity to losses translates over into the environmental domain (Shogren 2002); 
people often expend much greater effort chastising firms that are highly polluting rather 
than rewarding firms that are working to improve the environment. For this reason, “Top 
10” worst polluter lists have significant potential to stimulate activism since they 
highlight firms with the worst environmental performance (in absolute and relative 
terms), which from a concerned citizen’s standpoint translates into a loss of 
environmental quality. 
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  This paper attempts to isolate the extent to which the distinction of being on a 
“Top 10” worst polluter list within a given state affects a firm’s environmental releases. 
Examining “Top 10” lists at the state level is chosen for two reasons; one policy oriented 
and one econometric. From a policy standpoint, it is easier to make changes in state 
versus national environmental regulations; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that firms 
will be more responsive to how they are perceived by politicians, environmental groups, 
and citizens at the state level. In addition, public pressure due to environmental concerns 
is often localized since the people who live in the vicinity of highly polluting firms have a 
direct and immediate incentive to curb firm emissions. Finally, firms that fall within the 
“Top 10” list within a given state may not rank high nationally, and therefore the national 
rankings will not include many facilities that likely face significant pressure to reduce 
their emissions at the state level
11.  
From an econometric standpoint, the major change in the TRI rules that occurred 
in 1998, when seven new highly polluting industries were added to the TRI database, 
provides a quasi-natural experiment that helps identify causality between changes in 
facility pollution rankings within states and subsequent facility emissions. Existing TRI 
facilities in states that had many new entrants experienced large drops in their pollution 
rankings, often leading to their removal from the “Top 10” worst polluter lists, while 
facilities in states without many of the new industries saw little to no change in their 
rankings. If state pollution rankings do matter then facilities in the former group had less 
incentive to reduce emissions after the rule change, and as a result, likely reduced 
emissions less than they would have had they not experienced the unexpected drop in 
their rankings.  
The econometric results confirm that being on a “Top 10” worst polluter list 
within states did affect facility emissions in the direction predicted; overall, facilities that 
had already been covered under the TRI through 1998, and had been ranked as one of the 
“Top 10,” reduced their emissions on average by hundreds of thousands of pounds less 
than they otherwise would have had they remained on the “Top 10” list. This is the first 
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paper to demonstrate explicitly that facility environmental releases are influenced by 
pollution rankings. 
This finding is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that pollution 
rankings, and hence the information provided by the TRI does influence facility 
emissions, thereby bolstering the general case for “Right to Know” programs. 
Organizations such as the World Bank are currently investigating whether “Right to 
Know” programs may be a cost-effective environmental regulatory tool for developing 
countries given the (perceived) success of the TRI and its relatively low cost. In addition, 
the EU recently began a program similar to the TRI
12 and many groups in the U.S. would 
like to expand the TRI. Second, the econometric results show how changes to a “Right to 
Know” program can have unintended consequences; in this case the expansion of the TRI 
(with the intent of putting pressure on an additional set of extremely polluting facilities) 
decreased the incentives for firms already covered by the program to reduce their 
emissions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II surveys the TRI 
literature as well as recent work regarding other types of “Right to Know” programs. 
Section III provides an overview of the TRI data and problems regarding its accuracy. 
Section IV uses a simple econometric model to estimate whether facility environmental 
releases were affected by the removal of facilities from “Top 10” worst polluter lists 
within states. In Section V the policy implications of the results are discussed. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Most researchers who have studied the TRI are convinced that at least part of the 
decline in TRI-reported chemicals is tied directly to the provision of the information 
mandated by the TRI legislation. (Cohen 1997, Fung and O’Rourke 2000, Graham 2000, 
Jobe 1999, Stephan 2002, Restrepo 1999, Troy and Kraft 2003, Hamilton 2005). From 
hundreds of interviews with environmental groups, business operators, politicians, 
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community groups, and reporters, the consensus is that the TRI has greatly influenced 
firm behavior. On page 254 of his recent book on the TRI, Regulation Through 
Revelation: The Origin, Politics, and Impacts of the Toxic Release Inventory Program, 
Hamilton (2005) summarizes this consensus view: 
 
Information provision can work. The TRI changed the property rights to 
information about toxics, forced firms to estimate toxic figures, and combined the 
resulting information into a database made increasingly easy for the public to use. The 
provision of TRI data clearly changed behavior. Case studies abound about managers 
who learned about pollution figures for the first time, communities that placed pressures 
on facilities for reductions, and regulators that used the data to focus on particular 
chemicals or facilities. Overall, the TRI become a standard by which actors in the private 
and public sectors measured companies’ environmental performance.  
Environmentalists used the data to develop reports and lists that often focused 
attention on firms or plants that ranked the highest on some aspect of the TRI data.  
 
Fung and O’Rourke (2000) refer to the common practice of using the TRI to 
create “worst polluter” rankings as a type of “Maxi-Min” policy instrument, in which 
maximum attention is focused on the facilities with the minimal environmental 
performance (highest levels of pollution). From a regulatory perspective, these lists offer 
the potential for continual pressure on firms to decrease pollution since the lists are 
generated based on emissions relative to other firms, and hence there are always “worst” 
polluters in every period.  
A number of researchers have demonstrated a link between TRI reporting and 
stock performance. Hamilton (1995) found that the TRI provided “new” information to 
investors and that the stock performance of publicly traded companies was significantly 
and negatively correlated with toxic releases on the day after the TRI report was released 
in 1989, often translating into decreases in stock valuation of millions of dollars per firm. 
Khanna et al. (1998) examined the stock returns for major firms in the chemical industry 
between 1989-1994 on the day after the TRI data was released and found that from 1990-
1994 firms whose emissions were worse compared to their own past emissions, or 
relative to industry trends, suffered significant and negative stock valuations. Cohen and 
Konar (2001) found that toxic releases were negatively correlated with stock performance 
for a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing firms in 1989. However, there have also been   8 
papers that have questioned the link between the TRI and stock performance. Bui (2005) 
corrects for previous “event” studies, which did not take into account that all firms have 
the same TRI event windows and thus are correlated, and finds no statistical evidence 
that TRI reporting affected the stock performance of firms in the petroleum industry.   
Regarding the composition of emission reductions, Hamilton (1999) found that 
firms which emitted more carcinogenic chemicals were more likely to reduce emissions 
between 1988 and 1991
13. Arora and Cason (1996) and Khanna and Damon (1999) used 
the TRI data to explore why firms may have decided to participate in the EPA’s 
voluntary pollution reduction program, “33/50.” They found that firms with high public 
visibility were more likely to enter the program, and that potential environmental 
liabilities were also a deciding factor in their decision to participate
14. 
The TRI data has also been used extensively to study issues related to 
Environmental Justice, such as whether firms site toxic waste facilities disproportionately 
in poor and minority communities, and whether toxic emissions are influenced by 
community demographics (Rhodes 2003, Arora and Cason 1999). Although there is a 
strong correlation between toxic releases and concentrations of poor and/or minority 
populations throughout much of the U.S., all else equal, the main determinant influencing 
facility emissions tends to be the level of political participation people exercise in their 
respective communities. 
In addition to external forms of pressure to reduce emissions, before the advent of 
the TRI many facilities had never before performed environmental audits, and the 
detailed analyses of their own emissions mandated by the TRI may have actually helped 
some of them uncover inefficient aspects of their own production processes (U.S. EPA 
2003)
15.  
Within a developing country context, Afsah et al. (2000) found that an 
environmental “Right to Know” program in Indonesia led firms to reduce their emissions, 
while also improving facility efficiency by requiring internal environmental audits. The 
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authors describe the process how Indonesian firms were “shamed” into reducing 
emissions after being highlighted as serious polluters. In Canada, where the government 
enacted a program very similar to the TRI, Antweiller and Harrison (2002) found 
evidence that “green consumerism” linked to pollution reporting had a significant effect 
on toxic emissions reductions.   
Zhe Jin and Leslie (2003) analyzed the effects of a unique “Right to Know” 
program in Los Angeles, CA, which mandated that all restaurants clearly post the results 
of their health inspection scores based on a simple letter grade A to F. They found that 
not only is consumer demand sensitive to the restaurant health scores (lower health scores 
resulting in lower demand), but that after the introduction of the program, the incidence 
of food-borne illnesses decreased in the surrounding area, both due to the increased 
demand for cleaner restaurants, as well as health improvements (made in response to the 
“Right to Know” program) in formerly poorly rated restaurants. 
In summary, the TRI has been demonstrated to influence the stock valuation of 
U.S. firms, and similar “Right to Know” programs in other countries have influenced 
firm emissions. In addition, U.S. firms emitting highly carcinogenic chemicals have been 
sensitive to the TRI reporting and decreased these types of emissions more than firms 
whose emissions are less toxic. “Right to Know” programs are not limited to 
environmental data, and a program based on health inspections has also influenced the 
behavior of both consumers and restaurant owners in L.A., resulting in less illness.  
The following study adds to the research on “Right to Know” programs by 
examining whether the TRI has had effects on the emissions of “Top 10” worst polluter 
facilities throughout the entire U.S. through the medium of facility pollution rankings 
within states. “Top 10” lists are an efficient way of both presenting emissions data to the 
public and for targeting regulatory action, and examining whether firms respond to this 
identification is a logical step in the large and growing TRI literature.  
 
III. The TRI Data: An Overview 
 
The TRI data come from the EPA, which provides the reported releases and 
chemical transfer data for all TRI facilities for all years as well as additional descriptive   10 
information such as the facility name, address, zip code, 4-digit SIC code, production 
ratio (the ratio of total output in one year to the next) and parent company name. Total 
environmental releases include all reported on-site releases to air, water, and land 
(including underground injection), and are reported separately for each of the almost 650 
listed chemicals. A facility’s total environmental releases in a given year is the sum of a 
facility’s releases in all of these categories
16. The yearly installments of the TRI data are 
made available to the public in June a year and a half after the end of any given reporting 
year, such that what is made available in June 2003 is the data through all of 2001. The 
number of facilities that reported under the TRI between 1987 and 2001 averaged close to 
20,000, and peaked in 2001 with almost 25,000.  
Figure 1 shows the national distribution of TRI facilities in 2001. The majority of 
facilities are concentrated east of the Mississippi River, with the majority of these 30+ 
states containing hundreds of facilities. There are relatively few TRI facilities scattered 
throughout the West except for the coastal states, which also contain significant 
concentrations of facilities, particularly in California. 
Figure 2 shows total reported environmental releases under the TRI from 1988 to 
1997
17. (At this point, the discussion is limited to this time period because of changes in 
the TRI program in 1998, which is discussed in the next section.) Not only did reported 
releases drop by more than 60 percent during this period (from a high of almost six 
billion pounds in 1988 to around two billion pounds in 1997), but at no point did total 
environmental releases increase from one year to the next. These environmental releases, 
however, were extremely concentrated within a relatively small number of facilities.  
Figure 3 uses pollution rankings to highlight how the “Top 10” greatest polluters 
across states accounted for a widely disproportionate share of total U.S. environmental 
releases. The y-axis shows the percentage share of total U.S. environmental releases 
(averaged across the years 1988-1997) and the x-axis groups facilities according to their 
total environmental release rankings within their respective states. The sum of the 
environmental releases from facilities that comprised the “Top 10” biggest emitters 
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Scorecard and most other organizations use the term “Total Environmental Releases.” 
17 Although the TRI officially began in 1987 the quality of the data in the first year is considered unreliable 
and therefore is omitted.   11 
across the 50 states accounted for, on average, approximately 55 percent of total U.S. 
environmental releases each year (with a minimum of 53% and a maximum of 60% in 
any given year). Put another way, the approximately 500 facilities
18 that comprised the 
“Top 10” worst polluter lists in their respective states (50 times 10) were responsible for 
more than half of the total environmental releases emitted by the more than 20,000 TRI 
facilities in the entire U.S.; approximately 1/40 of the TRI facilities released more than ½ 
of the total reported toxic chemicals. This high concentration of total environmental 
releases dips dramatically as the next 10 biggest emitters (ranked 11-20) accounted for on 
average only 11 percent of total environmental releases, less than one-fifth of the releases 
of the facilities ranked 1-10. By the time we move beyond facilities ranked 30 or more, 
each ranking group accounts for at most only a few percentage points of total U.S. 
environmental releases.  
As Fung and O’rouke (2000) point out, worst polluter lists help to focus attention 
on a manageable subset of facilities that are responsible for the greatest environmental 
pollution, and hence may be an efficient way means of prioritizing environmental 
activism. As Figure 3 shows, in the case of the TRI, “Top 10” worst polluter lists within 
states target the facilities that are responsible for the majority of environmental releases. 
It is important to note, however, that total environmental releases may be a poor proxy 
for actual levels of toxicity and environmental damage because of the heterogeneity of 
toxicity of the hundreds of TRI chemicals. For example, some TRI chemicals are orders 
of magnitude more toxic than others, and there are instances where a facility that ranks 
high on total environmental releases may rank low based on some form of “toxic 
scoring
19” (and vice versa). Despite this complication, this study focuses on total 
environmental releases because this has been the category most cited by media sources, 
used by the EPA in its own rankings reports, and is the default used on the Scorecard 
website. There are literally dozens of toxicity categories and weighting schemes to 
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choose from
20 and for the purposes of this analysis, which focuses on overall media 
exposure, total environmental releases is a reasonable choice.  
Table 2 shows the breakdown by industry of the facilities that filled the majority 
of the “Top 10” lists within states. The chemicals and paper industries accounted for 
almost half of all the facilities on “Top 10” lists
21 while the primary metals, food, and 
petroleum and coal industries each accounted for approximately an additional 10 percent 
of the facilities on state worst polluter lists. The remaining 25% of “Top 10” listings 
came from any of dozens of industries throughout the manufacturing sector. Figure 4 
shows the sum of environmental releases for the facilities in the five industries most 
prominent on “Top 10” worst polluter lists within states between 1997 and 2001. 
Environmental releases for the chemical industry steadily declined over this period and 
by 2001 had fallen approximately 30%, while releases in the metal industry increased in 
1998-2000 and then declined sharply in 2001. Releases for petroleum and coal and the 
food industries increased over this time period while releases in the paper industry 
remained relatively flat. 
All of the TRI data are self-reported by firms and firms are not required to 
specifically monitor all of their TRI chemical releases, but at minimum, must present 
reasonable release estimates. The EPA does not employ a comprehensive system for 
auditing TRI reports and firms do not face regulatory penalties for inaccurate release 
estimates. In addition, the text of the EPCRA (the law which established the TRI) makes 
explicit that states are not required to expend significant effort in order to ensure accurate 
TRI reports. However, regional EPA offices look for large deviations in reported releases 
from one year to the next and routinely audit facilities that report the 10 greatest changes 
in environmental releases (both positive and negative) by SIC code, and request that they 
verify the accuracy of their data
22. In addition, the EPA keeps a close watch on industry 
trends regarding the environmental releases of different chemicals in order to establish 
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benchmarks with which to judge the accuracy of changes in releases in individual 
facilities. 
The EPCRA permits levying fines of up to $25,000 per violation of TRI reporting 
requirements; i.e. not filing the necessary TRI reports. Between 1990 and 1999 the EPA 
brought 2,309 administrative actions against facilities under EPCRA (U.S. EPA 2000). 
These fines (both in relative and absolute terms) are much lower than the fines for 
violations of the Clean Air Act; for example, in 2001 total penalties levied for TRI 
violations approached $4 million while fines levied for violations of the Clean Air Act 
were more than $84 million.  
Unsurprisingly, one of the major shortcomings of studies that seek to uncover 
evidence that the TRI has caused firms to reduce their environmental releases is that 
reductions in releases may be due to non-truthful or inaccurate reporting by facilities. 
Firms that face significant pressure to reduce their toxic emissions may have incentives to 
misreport their releases in order to demonstrate reductions that aren’t actually occurring, 
even if the reputational costs and any increased regulatory scrutiny may be great if they 
are caught. A few studies have uncovered significant evidence of inaccuracy within the 
TRI data, but the extent to which this is driven by purposefully dishonest reporting versus 
measurement error in estimating releases is unknown. 
A recent report by the Environmental Integrity Project (2004) analyzed TRI 
emissions data in 2001 in Texas and found underreporting in the range of 15%, with 
greater disparities for some highly carcinogenic chemicals. The study attributes this less 
to purposeful cheating on the part of firms, than on the outdated estimation techniques 
used for TRI reporting. It has also been observed that in some years the rate of non-
compliance with the TRI has been quite large, up to 1/3 of all covered facilities. 
However, Brehm and Hamilton (1996) show that the majority of non-complying facilities 
were very small, comprised a small percentage of total environmental releases, and often 
their non-compliance was the result of ignorance of the law rather than evasion
23. 
In a recent study by De Marchi and Hamilton (2005) the authors assessed the 
accuracy of the TRI data in two ways: by cross-checking the TRI data with a source 
outside the control of firms, and analyzing the TRI chemical reports for peculiar 
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statistical patterns. First, they compared reported releases of five TRI chemicals with the 
results of EPA regional emissions monitoring. They found that the releases of two of the 
five chemicals closely matched the monitoring results, two suggest overestimates of the 
reductions reported under the TRI (lead and benzene, which are highly toxic; benzene is a 
known carcinogen), and one which actually decreased more in the emissions monitoring 
than was reported under the TRI (ethylbenzene, which is also highly toxic). They also 
make use of Benford’s Law
24 to assess whether the reported releases for a larger subset of 
TRI chemicals are distributed in a manner that suggests accurate reporting. They found 
that for lead and nitric acid (two highly regulated chemicals) the reported releases did not 
adhere to the expected distribution. The authors posit that (in addition to the incentives to 
misreport) the inaccurate release estimates may be due to the fact that in absolute terms 
the releases per facility of these chemicals are relatively low, and therefore, significant 
effort is not invested to ensure precise release figures, and often “guesses” are made that 
may skew the aggregate distributions. 
In summary, while the TRI data represents the most extensive toxic release 
database in the U.S., there exists both the incentive to misreport releases and a relatively 
weak legal structure to monitor and punish such deviations (including mistakes in the 
reported figures). It is worth emphasizing, however, that this study attempts to uncover 
evidence that facilities reported lower emissions reductions, which is the opposite 
direction we would expect from untruthful reporting. 
 
IV. Does Being a “Top 10” Worst Polluter Affect Facility Environmental Releases? 
 
The ideal way to test for the effects of pollution rankings on facility releases 
would be to randomly create and disclose rankings in different states and then observe the 
changes in releases between the control and treatment groups, utilizing a difference in 
difference approach. In the absence of such an experiment, the most credible way to 
                                                 
24 Benford’s Law states that the first digits of self-reported data should follow a monotonically decreasing 
distribution; i.e. 1s should appear more frequently than 2s, which should appear more frequently than 3s, 
etc. This pattern has been verified in numerous types of datasets and is used by accountants as a way to 
detect discrepancies in balance sheets and tax forms. With respect to the TRI, Benford’s Law suggests that 
the first digits of the self-reported pollution figures should follow the same monotonically declining pattern. 
For the first digits of the TRI reported emissions data, 1s should appear more frequently than 2s, which 
should appear more frequently than 3s, etc.   15 
identify the effects of state rankings on releases is within the context of a quasi-natural 
experiment in which there is an exogenous shock to facility rankings that is different 
across different states, thereby creating a quasi-control and treatment group. Just such a 
shock occurred in 1998 when Congress changed the TRI rules and required seven 
additional industries to disclose their emissions data (see Table 1 for a list of the new 
industries). This rule change instantly added approximately 2,000 facilities to the TRI, 
spread out across all 50 states
25. These new industries were (and are) some of the 
countries largest polluters, and therefore, their addition lowered the rankings for the 
facilities that were already under the jurisdiction of the TRI. This expansion of the TRI 
program had been fought and stalled in Congress for many years and its passage could 
not have been easily anticipated by firms
26. 
These new facilities were concentrated in states with higher population, higher per 
capita income, higher levels of manufacturing, and slightly lower proportions of people 
identified as “white.” When regressing the number of new TRI entrants by state on these 
statewide variables (including the unemployment rate), the coefficient on population and 
the number of people employed in manufacturing are the only two which are statistically 
significant (see Table 3)
27. It is unsurprising that population and the number of people 
employed in manufacturing are correlated with the number of new TRI entrants since 
these are exactly the type of states that are the most likely to have more manufacturing 
facilities. There is, however, no statistically significant correlation between total 
population and levels of TRI toxic releases. Of the top 10 most populous states only four 
of them (Texas, Florida, Ohio, and Georgia) are among the states with the top 10 most 
toxic releases in the U.S.; the list is headed by Alaska and Nevada, states ranked 48 and 
35 respectively based on population. In addition, the level of manufacturing employment 
is not correlated with total toxic releases within states; of the 10 states with the highest 
                                                 
25 New industries accounted for approximately 1,900 additional facilities in 1998 and 2,150 in 2001. 
26 Some people have suggested that in fact many of the existing firms lobbied for the inclusion of these 
additional firms, and therefore, that the rule change was not completely exogenous. If this is true it would 
only strengthen the case presented here since it would demonstrate that these firms cared about their 
rankings and that they wanted other larger firms to enter the jurisdiction of the TRI to make their releases 
appear relatively less polluting. 
27 I regress the number of new TRI entrants in 1998 and 1999 on statewide variables in the year 2000 and 
2001 since these are the years where these new entrants affected the pollution rankings. The data comes 
from the U.S. Census Bureau.   16 
levels of manufacturing employment only 2 of them (Texas and Ohio) are among the 
states with the top 10 most toxic releases
28. 
Figure 5 shows total TRI environmental releases from 1988-2001, including a 
breakdown of the total emissions for facilities within the original and the new TRI 
industries. Due to the inclusion of the new industries in 1998 total environmental releases 
jumped more than threefold to almost seven billion pounds in 1998. In many cases, 
facilities that had formerly been on “Top 10” worst polluters lists experienced a decrease 
in their rankings to the point that they were no longer in the “Top 10.” Since these 
changes to the pollution rankings were exogenous any changes in facility emissions that 
can be traced to these changes provide evidence that rankings influence facility 
emissions. 
The addition of the seven new industries in 1998 only had the effect of potentially 
lowering the rankings of existing facilities. New entrants that released more toxic 
chemicals than an existing facility resulted in a lower ranking for the existing facility, 
while those that emitted less were ranked below them on the list and did not change their 
ranking. For example, if an existing facility emitted 10,000 pounds and was ranked #2 
and one of the new facilities in their respective state emitted 11,000 pounds (a quantity 
greater than the #2 facility) then the existing facility’s rank improved to #3. However, if 
the new facility emitted 9,000 pounds (a quantity less than the #2 facility) then the 
existing facility remained ranked #2 with one more facility added below them in the 
rankings. 
  The change to the TRI rules in 1998 produced large cross-section variation in the 
changes to state rankings because some states had a high proportion of new entrants 
while others did not. Therefore, in some states the facilities that comprised the “Top 10” 
worst polluter rankings remained largely the same, in others they almost completed 
changed, while some states experienced changes between these two extremes. Tables 4a 
and 4b show the reshuffling of the “Top 10” worst polluter rankings in Connecticut and 
Colorado respectively; two states with largely different mixes of the new TRI industries. 
Since pollution rankings are based on emissions data two years prior, the 1998 rule 
                                                 
28 In the regression analysis only a total of 5 facilities that were removed from the “Top 10” lists due to the 
exogenous change in rankings were located in Texas or Ohio; states that were ranked high on all three 
measures: population, manufacturing employment, and total toxic releases.   17 
changes only showed up in publicly disclosed pollution rankings in the year 2000, and 
then subsequently in 2001 as well. The leftmost column in Tables 4a and 4b represents 
the state ranking for total environmental releases based only on the industries originally 
covered by the TRI; that is, the ranking that a facility would have had if no expansion to 
the TRI program had occurred. For the years 2000 and 2001 this ranking is broken into 
two additional columns: a) the actual state ranking based on the complete list of facilities 
(which are the rankings that were made public) and b) the exogenous change in ranking 
brought about by the rule change, which is simply the difference between the actual 
reported ranking and what the ranking would have been without the addition of the new 
industries in 1998. In Connecticut, the majority of the facilities that comprised the “Top 
10” worst polluter list were largely the same as those which actually comprised the “Top 
10” list when all industries were included (i.e. these facilities did not experience major 
drops in their rankings due to the introduction of the new industries). In Colorado, 
however, the “Top 10” facilities comprising the pre-1998 industries experienced 
significant drops in their rankings after the TRI rule change, such that the majority of 
those that would have been amongst the “Top 10” facilities found themselves outside of 
the “Top 10” in both 2000 and 2001.  
The following is a simple model of facility environmental releases: 
 
(1) Ejt =  σj + βOutputjt + δTop10jt + δZs +εjt 
 
E= Total environmental releases for facility j at time t 
σj = Facility fixed effects for facility j 
Output= Total output of facility j at time t 
Top10= A dummy variable for facility j at time t that indicates whether the facility is 
currently on or off of the “Top 10” worst polluter list in its respective state 
Zs = A vector of state-specific covariates 
εjt = an iid error term for facility j at time t 
 
Firm fixed effects are assumed to capture industry effects, any state effects apart 
from the observed state covariates (including any state-specific environmental laws and   18 
regulations), parent company effects
29, and any facility-specific propensity to misreport 
releases or measure them incorrectly (which are assumed to be time invariant). The state 
covariates include population, the unemployment rate, the number of people employed in 
manufacturing, per capita income, and the percentage of the population that is white. 
The exogenous change showed up in the rankings in 2000 so the “cleanest” test of 
the effect of the change in rankings would be to test changes in emissions between the 
control group (“Top 10” facilities that did not experience the exogenous change) and the 
“treatment” group (those “Top 10” facilities which did) between 1999 and 2000. 
However, although the year 2000 is the only year in which the changes in rankings 
brought about by the 1998 expansion of the TRI program were truly exogenous, the year 
2001 is actually the year when it is reasonable to expect that full impact of the change in 
rankings could be observed. This is because 2001 was the first full year after the change 
in the TRI rules when facilities could respond to the reduced attention afforded by their 
removal from the “Top 10” worst polluter lists. These facilities first discovered that the 
inclusion of the new industries had resulted in their removal from the “Top 10”worst 
polluter lists in June of 2000, already half way into the year. It is reasonable to assume 
that there is at least a one-quarter lag between the time that businesses receive their most 
up-to-date ranking and any decisions to make changes in environmental releases, thus 
changes would have only shown up at the earliest in the very last quarter of 2000. In 
2001, however, firms that were no longer on “Top 10” worst polluter lists would have 
been able to take full advantage of this change and adjusted their environmental releases 
accordingly. Therefore, the change in emissions between 1999 and 2001 (the year 
immediately prior to the exogenous change in rankings and the year when the effects are 
likely to have been realized, if at all) is the appropriate outcome variable, which leads to 
the following differenced equation to be estimated: 
 
                                                 
29 Since there are instances where a parent company owns multiple facilities across multiple states there 
may have been incentives to shift environmental releases amongst facilities so as to avoid an unfavorable 
ranking in any particular state; i.e it might be better to be ranked 11 in two separate states than ranked 5 and 
15 in those states respectively. Of the more than 200 parent companies who owned facilities on “Top 10” 
worst polluter lists within states, only nine of them experienced both a decrease in the percentage of 
environmental releases attributed to their “Top 10” facilities at the same time as they increased total 
environmental releases summed across all facilities. This suggests that “reshuffling” pollution between 
states was not common.   19 
(2) ∆ Ej (2001-1999) =  β∆Outputj (2001-1999) + δ∆Top10j(2001-1999)  + ∆Z s (2001-1999)  + ∆εj (2001-1999) 
 
The change in total environmental releases from 1999 to 2001 can be calculated 
by simply subtracting total releases in 1999 from total releases in 2001. Measuring the 
change in output from 1999 to 2001 is more difficult since no facility-level data on 
physical production is available; especially which is comparable across different 
industries (i.e. units of energy inputs). The TRI dataset does contain, however, a 
production ratio variable
30, which is the ratio of total production from one year to the 
next. If multiplied by a proxy for the absolute quantity of output this can serve as a good 
approximation of the change in output in units that are commensurable across industries 
and facilities. Total environmental releases from two periods prior is the best available 
proxy for total output since this choice avoids simultaneity problems. If, for example, the 
production ratio is .5 and total environmental releases two years prior was 10 million 
pounds, multiplying these together results in 5 million pounds, which provides a (rough) 
estimate of the additional environmental releases that we might expect in the presence of 
the 50% increase in output. The mean of the production ratio variable in the year 2001 for 
the facilities in the sample is -.06 (i.e. negative 6%) with a minimum of -.96 and a 
maximum of 3.38
31.  
The “change in Top10” is a treatment variable that takes on a value of 1 if the 
facility was on the “Top 10” worst polluter list in its respective state in 1999 and 
remained on the list all the way through 2001; that is, it was not removed exogenously by 
the rule change. The control group (“change in Top10” equal to 0) contains those 
facilities that were on the “Top 10” list in 1999 and would’ve been through 2001, but 
were removed due to the exogenous change in rankings. The treatment, therefore, 
captures the effect of remaining on a “Top 10” list in the two years subsequent to the rule 
change.  
                                                 
30 Much thanks to Mike Toffel (Harvard Business School) for providing me with the cleaned production 
ratio data. Since many facilities produce many different products I used the median production ratio for all 
products produced by each facility. The data was cleaned by dropping all blanks, negatives, and zero 
values, followed by all outliers (defined as greater than the 98
th percentile since these are likely errors).  For 
his use of the production ratio data please see Toffel (2006).  
31 These summary statistics are for the 325 observations in the sample. They are the mean, min, and max of 
the median production ratio variable used for each facility after cleaning.   20 
The sample includes only those facilities that would’ve been on the “Top 10” list 
during the entire period from 1999-2001 had it not been for the exogenous change in 
rankings; some remained on the lists (the treatment group) while some were pushed off 
(the control group). The sample does not include the facilities that were not on the “Top 
10” list in 1999 but then entered the lists in 2000 or 2001, or facilities that were on the list 
in 1999 but even without the exogenous change in ranking were removed from the list in 
2000 or 2001.  
The sample includes the “Top 10”worst polluters by state, where the rankings are 
based only on the industries included under the original pre-1998 TRI regime. None of 
the facilities from the new industries are included; only the facilities in the industries that 
had been covered by the TRI since its inception in 1987. The hypothesis being tested is 
whether the facilities that received the treatment (remained on the “Top 10” lists) reduced 
their total environmental releases more than those facilities that were removed from the 
“Top 10” lists. If this did in fact occur, then δ should be negative, indicating greater 
reductions in environmental releases.  
Since the rankings are based on the emissions from two years prior, there is no 
simultaneity between the change in environmental releases and the change in “Top 10” 
status brought about by the exogenous shift in rankings. Approximately half of the 
facilities on “Top 10” worst polluters lists within their states in 1999 experienced this 
exogenous shift out of the “Top 10” rankings in 2000 (and subsequently in 2001). Out of 
the 10 facilities in each state that originally comprised these “Top 10” lists anywhere 
from 0 to 9 were shifted outside of the “Top 10” rankings, with a mean of approximately 
4 and a standard deviation of 2.5. 
It is important to note that this specification may actually underestimate the 
treatment effect of being removed from a “Top 10” list. In 1998 when the TRI legislation 
was amended to include the additional industries firms couldn’t predict whether they 
would no longer be on the “Top 10” lists in 2000; however, firms located in states with 
large power plants or mining companies knew that they would likely experience an 
improvement in their rankings. This may have led them to increase emissions between 
1998 and 2000, even before the changes in rankings brought about by the change in the 
law were made public.   21 
I estimate the model using a matching estimator that requires no assumptions 
about the functional form of the relationship between changes in emissions and the 
matching covariates, making it extremely flexible. The estimator matches facilities with 
similar covariates and then calculates the average treatment effect of being removed from 
the “Top 10” lists by comparing the changes in emissions between closely matched pairs 
in the treatment and control groups. For example, it compares the difference in the 
change in emissions between facilities with similar changes in output, similar past 
emissions, and similar changes in statewide covariates, some of which remained on the 
“Top 10” list and others that did not. It then takes the average effect of the treatment 
across the entire sample. 
Before discussing the econometric results, it is worth noting that the raw data 
support the hypothesis that the exogenous removal of facilities from the “Top 10” lists 
affected their subsequent emissions in the predicted direction. Figure 6 shows that 
facilities which remained on “Top 10” lists (that is, were not pushed off the lists due to 
the exogenous change in rankings) decreased their emissions on average 27% from 1999 
to 2001 (from 3.7 million pounds to 2.7 million pounds), while those facilities that were 
removed from the “Top 10” lists reduced their emissions on average only 5% during the 
same time period (from .99 million pounds to .94 million pounds). Figure 7 examines the 
five industries (in the original TRI industries) that comprised most of the “Top 10” 
entries on state worst polluter lists from 1999 to 2001 and compares the mean facility 
environmental releases for those facilities that remained on “Top 10” lists with those that 
were removed. In each of the five industries facilities that were removed from the “Top 
10” lists either reduced their environmental releases less in percentage terms (chemicals, 
primary metals, paper, petroleum and coal) or even increased their environmental 
releases between 1999 and 2001(food).  
Table 5 reports the results from the matching estimators with and without 
including the lagged emissions (for three periods) as additional matching variables. 
Because of finite sample bias in matching estimators, the estimator makes use of a bias 
adjustment procedure to produce consistent estimates
32. In addition, the standard errors 
reported are heteroskedasticity-consistent. In the simple comparison without lagged 
                                                 
32 See Abadie and Imbens 2002 and Abadie et al. 2004.   22 
emissions (column 1) the average treatment effect in terms of additional emissions 
reductions of remaining on a “Top 10” worst polluter list is estimated to be 
approximately 843,000 pounds; it is significant at the 99% level. Including lagged 
emissions as additional matching variables (column 2) increases the average treatment 
effect to approximately 885,000 pounds; again, the result is statistically significant at the 
99% level. These results indicate that conditional on the covariates, being removed from 
a “Top 10” list led to significantly higher emissions reductions. These results provide 
statistical support for the contention that being on a “Top 10” worst polluter list mattered; 
those facilities that did not receive the benefit of being removed from the “Top 10” lists 
reduced their emissions significantly more than those that did. 
 
V. Conclusions 
   
  The results from this study provide evidence that the TRI database did influence 
facility emissions through the medium of “Top 10” worst polluter lists. Facilities that did 
not experience exogenous drops in their pollution rankings, which resulted in their 
removal from “Top 10” worst polluter lists within their states, reduced emissions more 
than those which were removed. The results suggest that overall the more than 160 
facilities within the industries originally covered by the TRI who were removed from 
“Top 10” worst polluter lists released (at minimum) tens of millions of pounds of 
additional toxins into the environment due to their removal from these lists. To put things 
in perspective, even a combined effect of 100 million pounds of additional emissions 
(lower reductions) would represent less than two percent of total reported environmental 
releases in 2001.    
  These results have significant policy implications. Although changes to the TRI 
reporting rules led to less emissions reductions among already existing firms, the finding 
that firms do respond to pollution rankings should bolster the overall case for “Right to 
Know” programs. The TRI appears to be providing members of the public and policy 
makers with information that they act upon, which in turn, creates pressure on the most 
polluting firms to change their behavior (or at least report that they have). The costs (real 
or perceived) are significant enough that firms respond. Since environmental releases are   23 
heavily concentrated amongst the worst polluters, if emissions reductions are not just a 
product of misreporting, influencing their behavior is likely an efficient way of reducing 
overall emissions, especially since pollution rankings are relative and every year there are 
always “top” polluters.  
  Given that the maintenance costs of the TRI for the U.S. government have 
remained extremely low, at approximately $25 million a year, and the cost to industry of 
providing the information has dropped from approximately $550 million in the first year 
to $300 million a year since
33 (Fung and O’Rourke 2000), the TRI may be a potentially 
cost-effective means of better enabling the public to express its environmental 
preferences.  
These results also highlight the potential unintended consequences of bringing 
new entrants under the jurisdiction of the TRI. While the inclusion of new industries in 
1998 shifted the focus to facilities that polluted significantly more than already existing 
facilities, at the same time, this expansion decreased incentives for the latter group of 
facilities to reduce their emissions. Depending on the relative susceptibility of the new 
and existing firms to public pressure as well as their abatement costs, it is open question 
whether the change in the TRI rules will lead to long-term increases or decreases in total 
environmental releases across the United States
34.  
Despite the likelihood that the facility-level data provided by the TRI is not 
entirely precise, the results of the current study are still of interest and policy-relevant 
because they indicate that at minimum firms are concerned with the public perception of 
their emissions. The evidence in this study suggests that firms on “Top 10” lists actually 
report greater emissions reductions when compared to firms that were removed from 
“Top 10” lists. The facilities that were removed from the “Top 10” lists and didn’t reduce 
environmental releases as much were predominantly concentrated in more populous 
states where (ceteris paribus) we would expect greater overall pressure to reduce 
environmental releases, which again, points to the likely influence of pollution rankings. 
                                                 
33 This does not include the actual costs of emissions reductions, but simply the cost of providing the 
information to the government that the TRI legislation requires. The estimated cost of all U.S. 
environmental regulation is in the hundreds of billions per year. 
34 In addition, if the chemicals emitted by the original set of TRI facilities are significantly more toxic than 
the new entrants then changes in the composition of the TRI may have shifted attention to facilities that 
actually pose less of a health and environmental risk.   24 
Given that the TRI currently covers only a small fraction of the toxic chemicals 
emitted in the U.S. (approximately 5%) there is significant room to expand the scope of 
the program, but as this paper has demonstrated, there may be unintended consequences 
that should be taken into account when significantly altering the composition of pollution 
rankings. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of TRI Facilities 2001 
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Table 1: New Industries Added to the TRI as of the 1998 Reporting Year 
 
 
SIC Code  Industry Group 
10  Metal mining (except for SIC codes 1011,1081, and 1094) 
12  Coal mining (except for 1241 and extraction activities)  
4911, 4931, and 4939  Electrical utilities that combust coal and/or oil  
4953  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C 
hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities  
5169  Chemicals and allied products wholesale distributors  
5171  Petroleum bulk plants and terminals  
7389  Solvent recovery services  
 
Table 2: Breakdown of “Top 10” Facilities Within States By Industry 
 
 
Industry 
Approximate Share 
of “Top 10” Facilities 
Within States 
 
Chemicals  25% 
Paper  20% 
Primary Metals  10% 
Food  10% 
Petroleum and Coal  10% 
 
Table 3: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = Number of New TRI Facilities Added to States 
 
Population (1000s)  .02 
(.003)** 
Percentage of Population Identified as 
“White”  
.32 
(.68) 
Unemployment Rate  -.80 
(10.2) 
Per Capita Income ($1000s)  -1.7 
(2.05) 
Manufacturing Employment (1000s)  .13 
(.05)* 
No. Observations  100 
R
2  .77 
 
Standard Errors in ( ): *= significant at 95% level, **=99% level 
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Table 4a: “Top 10” Ranked Facilities Based on Pre-1998 TRI Industries  
Connecticut 2000-2001 
 
 
 
Facility Ranking 
(Within Original TRI Industries only) 
2000 
 
Actual State     Exogenous    
   Rank                Change   
 
2001 
 
Actual State       Exogenous    
   Rank                  Change   
1  1  0  1  0 
2  2  0  2  0 
3  3  0  3  0 
4  4  0  4  0 
5  5  0  5  0 
6  7  1  6  0 
7  8  1  8  1 
8  10  2  9  1 
9  12  3  10  1 
10  13  3  12  2 
 
 
 
 
Table 4b: “Top 10” Ranked Facilities Based on Pre-1998 TRI Industries  
Colorado 2000-2001 
 
 
 
Facility Ranking 
(Within Original TRI Industries only) 
2000 
 
Actual State     Exogenous    
   Rank                Change  
  
2001 
 
Actual State       Exogenous    
   Rank                  Change   
1  8  7  2  1 
2  11  9  5  4 
3  12  9  9  6 
4  13  9  11  7 
5  14  9  12  7 
6  16  10  14  8 
7  18  11  20  13 
8  20  12  21  13 
9  21  12  22  13 
10  24  14  25  15 
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Table 5: Matching Estimator Results
35 
 
1. Outcome Variable (for average treatment effect): Change in facility total 
environmental releases between 1999 and 2001 in 1,000s of pounds 
 
2. Control Group: Facilities in the original TRI industries that were on “Top 10” worst 
polluter lists within their respective states between 1999 and 2001  
 
3. Treatment Group: Facilities that were on “Top 10” worst polluter lists within their 
respective states in 1999 but were then exogenously removed in 2000 (and subsequently 
in 2001) 
 
4. Matching Variables:  
Change in facility output from 1999 to 2001 
Change in state unemployment rate 1999 to 2001 
Change in state per capita income 1999 to 2001 
Change in % of population white 1999 to 2001 
Change in # of people employed in manufacturing 1999 to 2001 
Change in state population 1999 to 2001 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Average treatment effect 
due to exogenous removal 
from “Top 10” List 
 
 
-843 
(218)** 
 
 
-885 
(285)** 
Includes lagged  
emissions (for 1996-1998) 
as additional matching 
variables 
N  Y 
No. Observations  326  325 
 
Heretoskedasticity-consistent standard errors in (  ) 
 
**= Statistically significant at the 99% level 
 
 
                                                 
35 The matching estimator makes us of a bias adjustment procedure in order to correct for finite sample 
bias. See Abadie and Imbens 2002 and Abadie et al. 2004. 